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Corporate Headhunting
Daniel C. Richman*
A wide range of commentators-including some pretty sophisticated
ones-have raked through the ruins of the 2008 financial collapse, confident
that there are significant criminal prosecutions to bring against individuals
and that the Justice Department should be faulted for its failure to bring
them. Their confidence that blockbuster criminal cases could have been
made rests on shaky grounds. So, too, does their faith that the hunting of
heads is a socially productive response to the collapse. If anything, a focus
on headhunting will only distract from, and reduce the pressure for, efforts
to explain the collapse and prevent its recurrence.
In a country where "to make a federal case" out of something is simply
to treat it seriously, one can hardly quarrel with the instincts of laypeople
who think that federal prosecutions are a fitting answer to-even a solution
for-massive institutional failures over which extravagantly paid chieftains
presided. All too frequently absent from current debates has been sustained
engagement with realities of federal criminal law enforcement-realities
that even Judge Jed Rakoff, a masterful Southern District of New York trial
judge and one of the nation's leading white collar crime experts, gave short
shrift to in a recent article.' The goal of this essay is to bring somewhat
prosaic considerations of law and institutional capacity back into the conversation. While I offer little in the way of regulatory or architectural reform, I
simply seek to clear away broad rhetoric that can only impede such efforts.

I. WHY HAVEN'T MORE HEADs ROLLED?
Before considering the challenges of evaluating the performance of federal prosecutors at any time, we should note that it's a bit early to pass judgment. To be sure, the five-year statute of limitations for most federal crimes
will preclude the prosecution of most offenses completed at the end of 2008.
But § 3293 of Title 18-passed in response to the Savings and Loan Crisis-sets a ten-year statute of limitations for a variety of fraud or false statute offenses affecting financial institutions.2 Moreover, the sophisticated
prosecutor with evidence of clear wrongdoing (or who wants assurance that
she can use evidence not yet obtained) can take comfort in a variety of
* Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful to
Miriam Baer, Sam Buell, Jim Comey, Jeff Connaughton, Denise Cote, Michael Graetz, Ray
Lohier, Jerry Lynch, Danny Sokol, Kate Stith, and Rich Sullivan for very helpful conversations
in connection with earlier drafts of this piece. The views expressed and the mistakes made
here are mine alone.
'Jed S. Rakoff, The FinancialCrisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, at 4.
2 18 U.S.C. § 3293 (2006).
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money laundering, conspiracy, and racketeering theories that expose bad
guys to prosecution for far longer than five years.3 So there's plenty of time
before the grading deadline. And we can expect considerable information
will be shaken loose-perhaps even on critical issues like knowledge and
intent-as firms fight over who will bear losses, disgruntled individuals seek
retribution or qui tam recoveries, and regulatory enforcers work through
backlogs.
Although one can't be sure, my sense is that the normal lack of patience
that attends almost any prosecutorial response that takes longer than a TV
show has been exacerbated by the very different timelines of the Madoff
case and the insider trading cases against Raj Rajaratnam and his band of
illegal tippers. Coming right after the 2008 collapse and involving Wall
Street denizens, those cases may have seemed to promise some accelerated
retribution. But Bernard Madoff was virtually a walk-in: no federal criminal
investigation was pending against him when he confessed his fraud to his
sons and they, in turn, alerted authorities.4 The precise nature and extent of
his scheme has not even been fully determined as of 2014.1 And Raj
Rajaratnam's conspiratorial conversations were intercepted by FBI agents as
his scheme unfolded, thanks to wiretaps obtained on the basis of informant
accounts. 6 The potent investigative combination of wiretaps and cooperators-so useful in insider trading cases-requires both real-time leads about
ongoing criminal activity and conduct so obviously illegal to its participants
that their efforts to conceal it delineate their criminal intent. Neither can be
assumed to be available in cases relating to the financial collapse.
Recent critics of the Justice Department regularly draw comparisons
between the allegedly pale response to the 2008 Collapse and the allegedly
robust response to the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s (hereinafter S &
L Crisis), the latter of which we are told led to "more than eight hundred"
convictions of individual defendants.' But to celebrate the S & L Crisis
3 While notions of continuing crime can be remarkably expansive in federal criminal law,
there are limits. See United States v. Grimm, 738 F.3d 498 (2d Cir. 2013) (overturning antitrust conviction on statute of limitations grounds).
4 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF's PoNzI SCHEME, at 20-21 (2009), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf. See also United States v. Castaldi, 743 F.3d 589 (7th
Cir. 2014) (affirming sentence of defendant convicted of a $40 million Ponzi scheme that
government learned about in November 2008 only when defendant turned himself in).
'See Rachel Abrams, Jury Decides 5 Employees of Madoff Knew Score, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 2014, at Bl.
6
See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding conviction and
rejecting defendant's challenge to wiretap application). See also United States v. Gupta, No.
12-4448, 2014 WL 1193411 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (upholding conviction of executive based,
in part, on intercepted conversations involving Rajaratnam).
Rakoff, supra note 1, at 4. See also Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, In Financial
Crisis,No Prosecutions of Top Figures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at Al; Jason M. Breslow,
Were Bankers Jailed in Past FinancialCrises?, PBS FRONTLINE, Jan. 22, 2013, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/
were-bankers-jailed-in-past-financial-crises/.
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response as the epitome of a white-collar crackdown is to rewrite history.
The Justice Department was similarly excoriated for its lameness back then.'
Moreover, as Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman found in their valuable study of
that Crisis, the criminal activity there-which generally amounted to
straightforward self-dealing for personal gain-had a lot more in common
with organized crime than with "traditional corporate crime" done for corporate gain.9 What amounted to "collective embezzlement"10 could be pursued the way fraudulent self-dealing has always been pursued, by focusing
on the often tortuous transactions that led from institutional accounts to private pockets.
Counting the heads that rolled in the wake of the S & L Crisis from
small institutions scattered across the country and comparing the total to the
number currently plated just won't do. Indeed, if one simply wants to count
heads, the number of S & L prosecutions (which included plenty of small fry
defendants) needs to be measured against not the small number of significant
financial players prosecuted since 2008 but the large number of federal and
state cases brought against the people who took out, gave, or administrated
"liar loans." Those are just the little guys, and even the seeking of their
little heads has been complicated by the prevalence of the conduct they engaged in. As Judge Richard Posner recently noted, in the course of reversing
the convictions of two mortgage applicants:
[T]he bank didn't give a fig about the couple's ability to repay the
loan. It planned to sell the loan, which would then be folded with
many other loans into a mortgage-backed security that would be
sliced and the slices sold around the world, the premise being that
the security would be safe because of diversification-the mortgages bundled into the security would be on properties scattered
across the United States. A nationwide collapse of the housing
market was not foreseen.']
According to a recent audit by the Justice Department's Inspector General's
Office, the number of federal mortgage fraud prosecutions may well have
been lower than that touted by the Department. 2 Yet the number of such
I See Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response to the
S&L Crisis, 59 FORD. L. REV. Sl55, S162-68 (1991).
9 Kr-ry CALAVITA, HENRY N. PONTELL, & ROBERT H. TILLMAN, BIG MONEY CRIME:
FRAUD AND POLITICS IN THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS 2 (1997).
"oK. Calavita, et al., The Savings and Loan Debacle, FinancialCrime, and the State, 23
ANN. REV. Soc. 19, 28 (1997).
" United States v. Philips, 731 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2013).
12See U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT 4-12, AUDIT OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE's EFFORTS TO ADDRESS MORTGAGE FRAUD, 29 (March 2014),
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2014/al412.pdf. It is worth noting that, adhering to the FBI's classification, the OIG Report differentiated between "mortgage fraud" and
"mortgage-backed securities fraud, which involves wrongdoing related to the packaging, selling, and valuing of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities." Id. at 2. The
OIG audited only the former type of cases, not the latter, which the Bureau classifies as "a
form of securities fraud." Id.
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cases"-for whatever that's worth-still dwarfs the number of S & L cases,
and that is not even counting the state and local mortgage fraud prosecutions, often brought in coordination with federal authorities.
Once we put bad analogies aside and squarely try to figure out whether
widespread criminal misconduct drove-or was even associated with-the
financial crisis, we face one of the classic accountability problems in federal
criminal law:14 since a financial collapse is not itself evidence of criminal
conduct, and white collar criminal activity is rarely revealed with any clarity
except by those responsible for prosecuting crimes, how does one assess the
adequacy of those prosecutorial efforts? When even such a savvy observer
as Judge Rakoff recently tried to avoid this accountability challenge by invoking alternative authority, his efforts fell flat. The best official evidence
he could offer "that the crisis was in material respects the product of intentional fraud" was the final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.'5 But the Commission did not and could not identify specific instances
of fraud with any authority. 6 Vague talk of "fraud" cannot suffice for Judge
Rakoff's purpose. And that Justice Department officials have failed "to indicate their disagreement" 7 with the Commission's report is equally beside the
point, as any such opining by prosecutors would have been unusual and
wholly inappropriate.
Judge Rakoff questions why the Justice Department has found it difficult to show that individuals selling mortgage-backed securities knew they
were committing fraud. After all, one need only look at the upswing in
"suspicious activity reports" of mortgage fraud that banks filed in the years
preceding the crisis.'" Yet if one combines wishful thinking that housing
prices would rise forever with insouciance about the loans underlying particular securities, the criminally culpable bad faith of these individuals is not
obvious. (That other parts of the firm may have worried about and hedged
against these risks is interesting but hardly dispositive.)
Of course, the difficulty in identifying criminal behavior ought not
shield the Justice Department from accountability. Nor should we be satisfied with assurances from its leaders that the Department stands ready to
'1

Id. at 16 (data indicating 248 filings in 2009, 632 in 2010, and 486 in 2011).

4See DANIEL

C.

RICHMAN,

KATE STITH, & WILLIAM

J. STUNTz, DEFINING FEDERAL

CRIMES 14 (2014).

supra note 1, at 4.
' See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. See also Peter J. Henning,
Crisis May Seem Criminal,but Try Making a Case, DEALBOOK (Jan. 28, 2011 9:30 AM), http:/
15 Rakoff,
6

/dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/crisis-may-seem-criminal-but-try-making-a-case

("The

commission's various conclusions provide a plausible defense for almost any executive who
might be accused of securities fraud or misleading investors: it was all the fault of uncontrollable market forces and regulatory laxity.").
" Rakoff, supra note 1, at 4.
'Id. See also FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 2009 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT "YEAR IN
REVIEw" (2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud2009; FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, MORTGAGE LOAN FRAUD: AN INDUSTRY
ASSESSMENT BASED UPON SusPICIous ACTIVITY REPORT ANALYSIS, at 8-9 (2006), available

at http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/rp/reports/pdf/mortgagejfraud I 2006.pdf.
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pursue any criminal case that is supported by the facts and evidence. Attorney General Holder has avowed: "To the extent that we have the ability to
bring cases against individuals or institutions, criminal charges, we will
bring them." 9 On the way out the door, former Criminal Division Chief
Lanny Breuer shook off criticism for not throwing Wall Street executives
behind bars and echoed: "If there had been a case to make, we would have
brought it. I would have wanted nothing more, but it doesn't work that
way."2 0 Even when fully credited, such pronouncements go both too far and
not far enough. Too far, because the breadth and depth of federal criminal
law have led us to expect and demand that prosecutors exercise judgment in
the massive discretionary space that Congress has effectively delegated to
them. 2 1 Not far enough, because-particularly in the white-collar crime
area-evidentiary strength is generally a function of prosecutorial effort, priorities, and institutional commitment. The point is not that these assurances
should not have been given, merely that they have little content.
Departmental leaders don't help matters when they talk about the challenges of proving criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 These are far
from trivial burdens, but prosecutors regularly meet them in any number of
mundane white-collar cases. Moreover, the facts set out in the recent departmental filings in civil cases and in criminal cases disposed of by non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements often suggest a real possibility
that more zealous enforcement efforts might allow the satisfaction of those
burdens. The "Statement of Facts" in the November 2013 $13 billion civil
settlement between the Justice Department and JPMorgan Chase, for example, asserts: "[E]mployees of JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu received
information that, in certain instances, loans that did not comply with underwriting guidelines were included in the RMBS sold and marketed to investors; however, JPMorgan, Bear Steams, and WaMu did not disclose this to
securitization investors." 23 These alternative resolutions may well have been
appropriate, but they aren't obviously so.
'9 Jim Puzzanghera, Holder Says No Bank "Too Big to Indict," More Financial Cases
Coming, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014, 8:16 AM), http://www.latimes.comlbusiness/moneyla-fimo-eric-holder-wall-street-banks-too-big-to-indict-20140124,0,6115949.story.
20Ben Protess, Breuer Reflects on ProsecutionsThat Were, and Weren't, DEALBOOK (Feb.
28, 2013, 8:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/breuer-reflects-on-prosecutionsthat-were-and-werent/.
21 See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecutions, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 608-18 (2005). See
generally Daniel C. Richman, Federal CriminalLaw, CongressionalDelegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757 (1999).
22 See Peter J. Henning, Making Misconduct a Crime, DEALBOOK, (June 24, 2013,
2:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/making-mismanagement-a-crime/ (quoting
Lanny A. Breuer).
23 Statement of Facts in Settlement Agreement, U.S. Dep't of Justice and JPMorgan
1 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/94320131119151031990622.
pdf. It is worth noting that this settlement does not preclude future criminal prosecutions of
individuals. See also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners
Secure Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with JPMorganfor Misleading Investors About
Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2013/
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While departmental officials' recourse to black letter law to explain
why more top executives have not been led away in chains thus adds little,
so too does the similar recourse of critics like Judge Rakoff who note that
prosecutors could ease their burden of proving intent by relying on concepts
of "willful blindness" or "conscious disregard." 24 A little more analytical
clarity would be useful here. Prosecutors regularly do invoke those theories,
often as an alternative ground for obtaining or defending a conviction, sometimes as a primary ground. But they require showing a lot more than recklessness. Rather, the government must prove not only that the defendant
believed there to have been a "high probability" that, say, underlying loans
were bad, but that he took "deliberate actions" to avoid learning the truth. 25
The standard stories of executive fecklessness relating to the 2008 collapse
have had little to say about the latter. Moreover, my sense is that, like the
Pinkerton rule-another burden-relaxing federal criminal doctrine-"willful
blindness" owes its survival as much to careful prosecutorial use as to judicial recognition. 26 Federal criminal law has its fancy aspects, and, given the
cognitive biases of their clients, wise counselors are right to be extraordinarily expansive when describing the sweep of potential criminal liability.
Any description of possible criminal liability therefore should include the
risk of indictment based on a "willful blindness" theory. Yet prosecutors
are well aware that if they can't present a clear narrative of moral wrongdoing, a felony case against an individual defendant isn't likely to go
anywhere. 27
The de facto requirement of blatant culpability-demanding that a defendant be shown to have had a subjective awareness of real wrongdoing 28is anchored in our use of general jurisdiction prosecutors and judges and of
lay jurors. It isn't a bug in our system but a feature.29 While pundits and
interest groups bewail formal doctrine that turns regulatory violations into
prosecutable offenses and rage at their inability even to count the number of

November/13-ag- 1237.html. ("This settlement resolves only civil claims arising out of the
RMBS packaged, marketed, sold and issued by JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual. The agreement does not release individuals from civil charges, nor does it release JPMorgan or any individuals from potential criminal prosecution. In addition, as part of the
settlement, JPMorgan has pledged to fully cooperate in investigations related to the conduct
covered by the agreement.").
24 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 4.
25 See Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070-71 (2011); United
States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471,
480 (4th Cir. 2012); RICHMAN, STITH, & STUNTz, supra note 14, 471-73.
26 See generally Mark L. Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A "New" Due Process Limit on
Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91 (2006), for an exploration of how courts
have limited expansive Pinkerton theories.
' See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing CorporateMisconduct, 60
J. L. & CONTEM. PROBS. 23, 49-50 (1997).
28 See Samuel Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1971, 1985-86 (2006).
29 Daniel Richman, Overcriminalizationfor Lack of Better Options, in THE POLITICAL
HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STNiz 64, 72-73
(Michael Klarman, David Skeel, & Carol Steiker eds., 2012).
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federal crimes, 0 the effective reach of federal criminal law is at least as
much a function of the highly constraining institutions charged with its enforcement as it is of substantive law. This is not just a matter of the limited
resources that have been allotted to white-collar investigations and prosecutions-and of the competing calls that have been made on the relatively
small federal enforcement bureaucracy.' It is also a matter of the grammar
of actual, as opposed to potential, criminal prosecutions. The complexity
and expansive drafting of modem criminal statutes all too frequently hide
the core criminality being targeted. But juries, judges, and hopefully prosecutors are looking for evidence of lying, cheating, and stealing. For all the
populist strains in the media and lay opinion, large paychecks and provable
criminal violations generally won't be enough to send an individual to jail in
the absence of "real" wrongdoing. The challenge for prosecutors isn't just
explaining complex transactions and shifting market conditions, but showing
why the defendant is worthy of being treated like a criminal.
To illustrate the challenge, one has only to look at the fizzling of the
options backdating prosecutions-at least those brought on the West Coast.32
The underlying conduct in those cases-the manipulation of the award dates
of employee stock options, which had the effect of suppressing a firm's compensation expenses-was hardly the highway robbery that critics insist is at
the root of the 2008 financial meltdown. Indeed, that very lack of comparability with the scale of the financial collapse may have hurt those prosecutions, brought before the meltdown but not tried until afterward. Yet the
acquittals and courtroom setbacks that ended most of them highlight the
heightened jury and judicial scrutiny that attends prosecutions in which
"criminality" is contestable. So, conversely, do the guilty verdicts (and pre-

30See BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND. & NAT'L Assoc. OF
CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, WITHOUT INTENT: How CONGRESS Is ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT
REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAw, 4 (2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf-media/

201 0/pdflWithoutIntent lo-res.pdf; Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As CriminalLaws Proliferate, More Are Ensnared,WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SBl0001424052748703749504576172714184601654. But see Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B.
Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalizationof Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 68
(2013) (noting that "[t]he number of regulatory prosecutions is so low, and such prosecutions
so rarely result in prison time, that the same few and dated examples are recycled through the
press year after year").
31 See Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions:Looking Back and Forward, 58 DUKE L.J. 2087 (2009). See also David M. Uhlmann, ProsecutorialDiscretionand
Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 159 (2014) (surveying environmental crimes
cases brought between 2005-2010 and finding, notwithstanding the murkiness of the line between criminal and civil violations, aggravating factors appeared in virtually every one).
32 See Peter Lattman, Backdating Scandal Ends With a Wimper, DEALBOOK (Nov.
11,
2010, 9:38 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/1l/backdating-scandal-ends-with-awhimper (noting, of backdating cases, that "on the criminal front, the government had mixed
results, winning several trials but also losing a number of prominent cases. In all, 12 executives across the country were received [sic] criminal sentences, five of them prison terms. The
others were sentenced to probation."); Peter J. Henning, Behind the Fade-Out of Options
Backdating Cases, DEALBOOK (Apr. 30, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/
04/30/behind-the-fade-out-of-options-backdating-cases.
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emptive pleas) in the insider trading cases, where, notwithstanding scholarly
critiques," "cheating" can be easily inferred and is easy to condemn.
Even the casual reader will recognize how vague I am being about what
constitutes "real criminality." And the more savvy reader will recognize
how plastic notions of "cheating" and "stealing" can be. It may well be that
a series of well-thought-out prosecutions could show judges, juries, and the
public that certain conduct related to the 2008 collapse is just the sort that
should put some people beyond bars. The point for now is simply that such
demonstrations take more than evidence of rampant profit maximization
(also known as "greed") and wishful thinking in the financial industry and
more than broad black letter understandings of fraud.
The Justice Department should not be allowed to hide behind talk of
crushing evidentiary burdens. Nor should it get credit for chest-thumping
and vague talk about its zealousness and political commitment. But criticism of its efforts ought not rest on hyper-speculation that doesn't go much
further than the adage that "behind every great fortune there is a crime."3 4
II.

WHAT PROSECUTING MORE INDIVIDUALS WOULD
COST AND ACCOMPLISH

Even if we can't figure out whether there actually are worthwhile criminal cases that the Justice Department has failed to bring, let's plunge aheadmaking non-trivial inferences about knowledge and intent, and collapsing
organizational structures that disaggregate function and dissipate responsibility. Let us assume that there is a class of provably criminal actors out
there-perhaps individuals who touted the low risk of securities dependent
on subprime mortgages that they knew to be both fraudulent and risky, or
perhaps executives involved in the fraudulent business model. To be safe,
let's imagine that the surrounding facts, if fleshed out, would show at least
one such guy to be a greedy sleazebag whose bonus skyrocketed based on
these transactions. I suspect a jury would convict him, and a judge wouldn't
derail the case or merely slap his wrist.
What exactly have we lost by not prosecuting him and his ilk? The
question is harder than it sounds, and the point of asking it is not to minimize the value of prosecuting individuals. Rather it requires us to think
clearly about how we are going to identify him, what his prosecution would
cost, and what it would gain. And it takes us from substantive law to procedure and institutional capability.
In an ideal world of infinite resources, federal investigators would be
well-versed in securitization mysteries and would pore through internal and
33

See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That

Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167 (2005).
' See Behind Every Great Fortune There Is a Crime, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Sept. 9,

2013), http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/09/09/fortune-crime
nance, in the work of Balzac and others).

(analyzing the adage's prove-
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external corporate communications, interview witnesses, and nail down our
guy's culpability on their own (and fill any number of enforcement gaps).
They would also go after all truly corrupt public officials not being pursued
by state or local authorities. But in our real world, federal law enforcement
agencies, particularly the FBI, are stretched thin and are unfamiliar with the
financial markets. The Postal Inspection Service-which not that long ago
played a critical role in securities fraud cases-is under pressure to retreat
from "investigations that are not inherently related to the Postal Service operations or mission,"" and regulatory agencies with more expertise have just
emerged from a long lean period.
The government therefore ends up relying heavily on internal investigations by firms trying to show their cooperation and avoid prosecution. The
pressure on firms to dig deep and share information was somewhat reduced
in the last years of the Bush Administration, when the Justice Departmentunder fire from corporate defenders, many members of Congress, and some
of the same editorial pages that now complain about the lack of corporate
prosecutions-assured firms that they need not waive the attorney-client
privilege or deliver the unfiltered results of their internal investigations when
"cooperating" with the government.3 6 Still, the pressure remains enough
that firms will spend massive amounts on internal probes."
The extent of the government's reliance on this motivated self-reporting
is troubling. It would certainly be better policy if the enforcement bureaucracy had a larger degree of choice about when it let firms-even those
represented by former prosecutors, usually with a well-deserved reputation
for integrity-take even a first crack at grading their own papers. I completely agree with Judge Rakoff that financial crimes should be given a
higher priority, with more resources committed and sustained to regulatory
agencies in particular. Yet the recent record of resource commitment is poor
indeed. Not only were regulatory agencies hard-pressed, but prosecutors
and the FBI-agencies whose punitive focus generally makes them more
attractive funding targets-were also underfunded." To much acclaim, the

" See Letter from Anthony J. Vegliante to Lucine Willis (May 17, 2011) in JOHN E.
FF-AR- 11-009, NEw APPROACHES TO REDUCE COSTS, APPENDIX D, at 34 (2011) (rejecting recommendation in attached audit report, NEw APPROACHES TO
REDUCE COSTS), available at https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-libraryfiles/2013/FF-AR-I 1-009.pdf.
6 See Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law, Developments in White Collar Criminal Law
and the Culture of Waiver, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 199, 205-11 (2009); Richman, Political
Control of FederalProsecutions,supra note 31, at 2110-16; Daniel Richman, Decisions About
Coercion: The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege Wavier Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 295,
298-302 (2008).
17 See Peter J. Henning, The Mounting Costs of Internal Investigations, DEALBOOK (Mar.
5, 2012, 11:07 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/the-mounting-costs-of-internalinvestigations ("When a corporation is caught in a government investigation, the legal fees can
quickly exceed $100 million - and that's before the lawsuits even begin.").
38 See Richman, Overcriminalizationfor Lack of Better Options, supra note 29, at 78-80;
Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REv. 577, 607-08 (2012).
CIHOTA, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE,
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Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 authorized $165 million for
the Justice Department for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 to pursue financial
fraud.39 But although the U.S. Attorneys' Offices and Main Justice's Criminal Division were authorized to receive $70 million in 2010 and $70 million
in 2011, Congress end up actually appropriating $9.3 million in 2010 and $0
in 2011. The FBI, authorized by the Act to receive $75 million in 2010 and
$65 million in 2011, was actually appropriated $25.5 million in 2010 and
$20.2 million in 2011.40
Optimally, civil regulators would closely coordinate with criminal enforcers, "contributing their institutional competence to prosecutorial efforts
and picking up those cases meriting less punitive treatment." 41 Accompanying such resource commitments would have to be institutional design measures that reduce pressure on the SEC, CFTC, and other agencies to focus on
quantity, not quality. This is far easier said than done. Judge Rakoff complains that the SEC has focused "on the smaller, easily resolved cases that
will beef up their statistics when they go to Congress begging for money," 42
but that pathology is endemic to the federal enforcement project. With
sprawling jurisdiction, limited resources, and political masters seeking shortterm evidence of achievement, federal enforcement agencies-whether dealing with workplace safety, environmental threats, corruption, or narcotics
trafficking-have long struggled with the tension between quantity and
quality. 43 Whether for lack of motivation or the inherent challenges of the
task, neither the bureaucracy nor its masters have made much progress in
devising performance metrics "that go beyond case or scalp counting.""
Let us pause on this resource commitment point. Not because it's
wrong, but because it's so obviously right-like counterterrorism, another
example of how ill-served bureaucratic development and sane regulatory
policy are by the swings between underreaction and overreaction that are
hallmarks of American politics. 45 Even here, though, one needs a nuanced
understanding of the nature of the problem. This is not simply a case of our
cycling between our periodic commitment to "small" government and our
panic or outrage at actual or perceived crises. It also reflects a concern of
" Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617,
1619.
OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 3-4.
Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 64-65 (2013); see also Lynch, supra note 27, at 54

40 U.S. DEP'
41

(noting the importance, "in areas of specialized regulatory enforcement," of "close coordination between criminal prosecutors and regulatory agencies").
42 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 6.
4 Richman & Stuntz, supra note 21, at 615.
"Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions, supra note 31, at 2121; see also
Baer, Choosing Punishment, supra note 38, at 599 ("Our metrics are not much more sophisticated than tabulating annual enforcement actions, criminal cases, convictions, and fines and
pointing out particularly salient wins or losses.").
45 See Daniel Richman, The Right Fight, Bos. REv., Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005, at 6 (on responses to 9/11).
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reasonable people that the institutional investments whose absence we bemoan in times of trouble also can lead to a worrisome policy slack in times
of peace and prosperity. Calling for a radical deleveraging of federal corporate crime enforcement is thus a fine opening bid. But-in our second (or
third) best world-unless one has follow-up suggestions, one will be left
cursing at the political economy of corporate crime enforcement from the
sidelines. Moreover, if one ignores political realities and simply demands
that federal funds be spent on one's particular policy preferences, one still
has to explain why the sizeable expenditures needed to create a self-sufficient enforcement capability are better spent there than elsewhere.
Let us next assume that somehow-whether through governmental efforts, internal investigation, or a jilted lover who tapes all conversationsenforcers can identify our mortgaged-backed securities malefactor. After
all, employees regularly worry that they will be thrown under the bus to
appease the regulatory gods. 46 What next? The allure of a few prosecutions
of just this sort is enormous: the bringing of criminal charges against an
identifiable malefactor makes for beautiful press and allows one to speak of
the bad apples of capitalism, even as one defends the basic project and the
integrity of the industry. Moreover, in a law enforcement regime rife with
horizontal inequality-where nearly every federal defendant can point to a
similarly situated perpetrator who has not faced federal charges 47-the Wall
Street defendant's complaint that "everyone was doing it" is likely to be met
with a shrug (except from the Wall Street Journal editorial board).
Yet the gains in prosecuting our guy shouldn't be overstated. Judge
Rakoff has suggested that, as in drug (or insider trading) cases, prosecutors
can "flip" their way up the chain to those who put the incentives in placeor created the culture-that powered this guy's misdeeds. I'm far less confident. Our guy might well cooperate in exchange for leniency. And maybe
he can give or lead the government to powerful evidence implicating more
senior executives. But if the goal is having identifiable individuals to prosecute, we will have to confront the real possibility that manifest criminal culpability becomes too diffuse once we move beyond him. As a matter of
socioeconomic policy, we should fault those top executives who set performance metrics that leave subordinates seeking advancement with few or
no options that don't cross the legal line. We also should devise measuresincluding prophylactic regulation, institutional design, and civil liabilitythat target those practices. But that policy condemnation will frequently not
easily translate into recognizable forms of criminal liability. The notion of
prosecuting "responsible corporate officers" on the basis of criminal misdeeds that occurred on their watch, and presumably because of conditions
they fostered, finds some (much contested) support in federal criminal doc-

46 See Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated InternalInvestigations: Achieving
Fairnessfor Corporate Constituents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 73, 99-101 (2013).
47 See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 21, at 630.
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trine.48 Yet in its contemplation of vicarious criminal liability for individuals, this liability theory has always been a doctrinal outlier,49 and I suspect
that judges and juries will ensure that it remains so. So we can't assume that
those at the top of the corporate chain will tremble at this prosecution.
In the absence of someone to testify against, our guy might go to trial.
Odds are that he will be convicted (although some aren't 0 ). Or he will plead
(because most defendants do) and get a sentence that, although probably not
driven by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that are not well suited for these
cases, will probably be anchored in that regime.' Nothing here is an argument against this result. Those looking for cathartic triumphs of accountability are bound to be disappointed, though, for the pace, specificity, and
legal technicalities of large-scale white-collar prosecutions makes those moments elusive. (Just think of the long Enron saga, in which the criminal
litigation sparked by the 2001 collapse of that firm is only just ending.52 )
But at least there will be deterrence, right? Some, I guess. Probably
more than from going after the average street drug dealer or ID thief. But
here again, public expectations cry out for management. Although empirical
evidence is scant, most (including me) assume that prosecution of a corporate executive for fraud sends a clearer message to the relevant community
than the prosecution of the average street criminal. Deterrence gains, however, will be a function of prosecution frequency. Unless we are careful-or
are ready for a more sustained commitment of resources-the message of a
relative handful of prosecutions will be "a few heads will roll when the
market takes a deep dive and the public seeks retribution." And the target
deterrence audience will weigh the slim chance that lightning will strike
them against the enormous financial gains from continued play.
Comparing alternative prosecutorial strategies, Judge Rakoff suggests
that "the future deterrent value of successfully prosecuting individuals far
outweighs the prophylactic benefits of imposing internal compliance measures that are often little more than window-dressing."53 Given how few
truly culpable individuals are likely to face prosecution-particularly in a
world where the focus on entity cooperation is lessened-this claim is far

See Richman, Stith & Stuntz. supra note 14, at 775-78.
See Samuel Buell, Is The White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 851-52
(2013) ("To hold a bank executive responsible for fraud on the basis of having looked the
other way, or behavior of that sort, while her traders built up a financial house of cards that
was doomed to collapse would ... require discussion about revising principles of responsibility fundamental to criminal law's general part.").
50 See Zachery Kouwe & Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stems Fund Leaders Are Acquitted, N.Y.
THWEs, Nov. 10, 2009, at Al.
" See Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress, supra note 41, at 70.
52 See Peter Lattman, Ex-Enron Chiefs Sentence is Cut by 10 Years, to 14, DEALBOOK
(June 21, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/prison-sentence-of-ex-enron-ceo-skilling-cut-by-10-years-2/.
s Rakoff, supra note 1, at 8.
48

49
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from clear. Or at least it's sufficiently unclear as to counsel-renewed consideration of how firms are pursued, as the choice is not so binary.
This brings us back to the issue of pursuing firms as well as-and often
instead of-individuals. It's worth noting from the start that the current approach is very much a work in progress, and that the world of Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) is
only a few decades old. These are the alternative resolutions prosecutors
have developed to give themselves choices beyond the stark ones of convicting a firm and letting it escape criminal liability altogether. 54 It's also worth
recalling that, although these corporate resolutions are frequently excoriated
as signs of undue government solicitude for corporate malefactors," they
have also been condemned as instruments of government oppression-the
means by which prosecutors unwilling or unable to prove up a case can
nonetheless extract massive monetary settlements from risk-averse but "innocent" firms, and perhaps also impose structural (or cosmetic) reforms.5 6
Each side may have a point, but figuring out which point applies to which
case will always be a challenge. The agreed-upon fact statements that sometimes accompany these resolutions are artifacts of the negotiation process
that preceded them. Admissions of culpability need to be taken in that context, as must claims of provability.17 Caution should therefore be exercised-at least by outsiders-before characterizing a resolution as lenient or
extortionate. Moreover, as previously noted, we ought not underestimate the
extent to which the ex ante threat of corporate liability powers the internal
investigations that may shake loose information about individual
wrongdoing.
Nor should we underestimate the effects on corporate behavior of the
burgeoning compliance industry that has been nurtured by, among other
things, legislative fiat and fears of corporate prosecution. Where a firm has
grudgingly inserted a compliance function into its organization function, one
should indeed worry that the change is merely cosmetic. One has only to
' See Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The "Too Big to Jail" Effect and the Impact
on the Justice Department'sCorporate ChargingPolicy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming June

2014), for a recent review of the history of DPAs and the literature about them.
" See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall St. Polices Itself Prosecutors
Use Softer Approach, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at Al; David M. Uhlmann, Op-Ed., Prosecution Deferred, Justice Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2013, at A23; David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-ProsecutionAgreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 72 MARYLAND L. REV. 1295, 1300 (2013).
5 See Brandon Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007); Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutorsfrom the Boardroom: Deterring Crime Without Prosecutor
Interference in Corporate Governance, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW To REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 62, 76-81 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E.
Barkow eds., 2011). See generally James R. Copeland, The Shadow Regulatory State: The
Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 14 CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT 1 (2012).
" See generally Gerald E. Lynch, Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM

L.

REV.

2117 (1998).

" See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 995

(2009) (discussing growth of compliance industry).
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look at the allegations so helpfully spelled out in the recent indictment of
SAC Capital Advisors 9 to see how corporate managers can marginalize the
personnel hired to look over their shoulders. Moreover, as Miriam Baer has
noted, "even those firms that implement compliance programs in good faith
will find themselves caught between market forces that demand better performance and the risk that employees may use noncompliance as a means of
meeting increasingly tougher goals."" Yet structures without organic roots
still can develop competence, confidence, and esprit over time. It is thus far
too early to grade the effectiveness-with respect to both legal compliance
and long-term economic efficiency-of this relatively new industry.
My colleague Jerry Lynch has nicely stated the case for, under certain
conditions, pursuing firms criminally:
Given the power of corporations, their reification as legal "persons" and (perhaps even more important) the desire of some large
public companies to present themselves as social and economic
personalities, the same concerns about fairness and public respect
for law that dictate criminal punishment of individual white collar
criminals argue against letting corporations escape the moral accounting that comes with a criminal prosecution, especially
(though not exclusively) when the corporate form makes it difficult to establish culpability on the part of any particular
individual.6 1
Corporation prosecutions are, in this sense, second-best-a recourse when a
situation merits a criminal response but there isn't a more satisfactory target.
We should not, however, underestimate the range of cases-particularly
where firm profit-maximizing behavior (as opposed to straightforward selfdealing) is involved-where corporate criminal charges will be the severest
appropriate response to misconduct within a firm. This is not an argument
for invariably targeting firms for criminal sanctions, but it is one for making
those sanctions more of a realistic option, and for getting beyond the rhetoric
of whether any firm is "too big to jail."62
The devastating force of criminal charges and the prospect of conviction generally comes less from the criminal sanction itself than from the
collateral consequences that a variety of regulatory frameworks have tied to
criminal sanctions. As a general matter of legislative or regulatory policy, it
makes sense to have contractual debarment, loss of licenses, or other such
consequences automatically follow a criminal conviction. Criminal convic" Sealed Indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P., No. 13-CR-00541
(2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Novemberl3/SACPleaDocs
/SAC%20Indictment%20(Stamped).pdf.
a Baer, supra note 58, at 1015.
6' Lynch, supra note 27, at 50-51; see also Sara Sun Beale, A Response to Critics of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1481 (2009).
62 See BRANDON L. GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS (forthcoming 2014); Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 54.
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tions entail adjudicated findings of highly anti-social conduct, and those
findings might appropriately have ramifications beyond the criminal process
(just as they do for the individuals who lose any number of rights and regularly face deportation as an automatic consequence of criminal conviction). 3
When such automatic linkage between criminal and collateral sanctions
leads public-regarding prosecutors-worrying about market effects or the
preclusion of critical government contractors-to think twice about charging
a firm deserving of criminal stigmatization, however, it may be time to reconsider linkage, lest we make criminal charges too devastating to use."4 In
conjunction with the Justice Department's recent targeting-in the LIBOR
case 6 5-of corporate subsidiaries (instead of parents), 66 this sort of experimentation with sanction decoupling seems worth developing.67
The foregoing pragmatic counsel raises the lurking issue-not whether
criminal stigmatization of firms is ever appropriate, but how much it's worth.
Sometimes it might be worth a lot, and the fact that the similar fines, forfeitures, reforms (cosmetic or real), and public attention can be obtained via
6 See Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103,
I 105-09 (2013).
' See Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?,
80 FORD. L. REV. 775, 806-15 (2011). Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York recently noted:
[O]ften the greatest existential threat to the company comes not from the prosecutor who has
the power to file an indictment, but from the regulator who has the power to revoke a charter.
In this context, it has been my experience that banking regulators with whom the revocation
decision ultimately rests are often loathe to commit to a decision before or even at the same
time as the prosecutor-even when all the relevant facts are known. This uncertainty created
by the unwillingness or inability to provide assurances (even when the actual likelihood of
revocation is extremely remote) can skew the decision-making process, can effectively tie a
prosecutor's hands, and can potentially let a bad company off the hook.

If the relevant regulator cannot rule out the possibility of a revocation of the banking charter,
then prosecutors must continue to consider that as a possibility. And inevitably-because not
all corporate criminal misconduct is deserving of a death sentence-prosecutors cannot be as
aggressive as they perhaps should be. That, in my view, is not a healthy dynamic.
Prosecutors and regulators have to work in concert. When they don't, they create a gaping
liability loophole that blameworthy companies are only too willing to exploit. The good news
is that this dynamic is changing for the better, and I expect you will see hard proof of that in
the future.
Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney, Prepared Remarks at SIFMA's Compliance and Legal Society
Annual Seminar (Mar. 31, 2014).
65 See Peter J. Henning, UBS Settlement Minimizes Impact of Guilty Plea, DEALBOOK
(Dec. 20, 2012, 1:54 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/ubs-settlement-minimizesimpact-of-guilty-plea/; Ben Protess & Mark Scott, Guilty Plea and Big Finefor Bank in Rate
Case, DEALBOOK (Feb. 6, 2013, 8:10 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/as-unitpleads-guilty-r-b-s-pays-612-million-over-rate-rigging/.
66 See Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 54, at Text Accompanying Notes
241-55.
6 See Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, The "Civil-izing" of White-Collar Enforcement, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2013 ("When the Justice Department has required a company to plead
guilty to a crime, it has sometimes allowed the plea to be entered by a corporate entity, such as
a subsidiary of limited scope or a dormant shell company. The practical effect has been to
preclude or limit the collateral consequences of a conviction, such as exclusion from federal
programs, and thereby render the criminal disposition akin to a civil settlement in which the
company chiefly pays money to end a litigation.").
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DPAs or civil suits ought not dissuade us from charging. Even as empirical
scholars try to figure out the market and reputation hit a convicted firm
takes,68 we should also consider the way a criminal conviction provides a
focal point for the development of public policy. When the criminal process
is working right, a conviction entails the announcement that the politically
accountable executive branch has deployed its discretionary enforcement
power against conduct that has previously been legislatively condemned,
and that a judge or jury has found the facts to support that deployment.
Convictions won't always jump-start productive conversations about institutional design and regulatory enforcement policy.6 9 Indeed, they sometimes
prevent such conversations from happening by allowing status quo defenders
to dismiss the defendants as bad apple outliers. But these larger policy conversations are a worthy goal. That said, the difference between a corporate
criminal resolution and a well-publicized and clear civil settlement with an
enforcement agency may not be as great as often imagined.
III.

CONCLUSION

And so we return to headhunting. Elsewhere, I have written more generally about the odd political and institutional dynamics in the United States
that all too often make criminal prosecutions a sweet spot in many policy
spaces. Criminal sanctions will simply be the "second-best preference" of
those who would really prefer a very different regulatory (or deregulated)
regime. 0 This phenomenon seems at play today. I suspect (but cannot
prove) that the loudest calls for corporate executive prosecutions come from
those who would have preferred more regulatory controls on corporate behavior before 2008 and who aren't satisfied with the regulatory response
since then. (Count me as one of that group.) For their part, those who worry
about the heavy hand of government may not be as keen to see heads roll.
But if forced to choose, I suspect they would prefer a few show trials to
sustained regulatory intervention.
In the face of the number of prosecutions under any realistic scenario
and their cost, I call only for better-managed expectations. Certainly there's
a place for individual prosecutions, even in those situations where the offenses were primarily or equally for the gain of the firm. But if simplistic
clamoring for more heads keeps us from considering more systemic regulatory reforms that better handle dangerous market "innovation," this will
have been one expensive cathartic exercise.
* See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH
144, 149-51 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012).
69 See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxtey Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (critiquing legislative measures sparked by the
Enron and WorldCom cases).
7o See Richman, supra note 29, at 83.
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